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Abstract. A vertically integrated rm, having acquired the intellectual property (IP)
through innovation to become an input monopolist, can extract surplus by supplying e¢ -
cient downstream competitors. That the monopolist would refuse to do so is puzzling and
has led to numerous debates in antitrust. In this paper, I clarify the economic logic of
refusal to deal, and identify conditions under which prohibiting such conduct would raise
or lower consumer and social welfare. I further show how IP protection (as determined
by IP laws) and restrictions on IP holdersconduct (as determined by antitrust laws) may
interact to a¤ect innovation incentive and post-innovation market performance.
*I thank Shiyuan Pan, Guofu Tan, Patrick Rey, Mike Riordan, Mike Waldman, semi-
nar participants at Cornell University (March 2011), and participants of the Workshop
on Industrial Organization and Competition Policy at Shanghai University of Finance and
Economics (June 2011) for helpful discussions and comments.
1. INTRODUCTION
Should a monopolist have an antitrust duty to supply an intermediate good to competi-
tors? The monopoly position for the intermediate good may have been acquired through
the ownership of certain intellectual property (IP) and/or of some unique physical assets.
In the U.S., courts have taken the view that IP owners have a presumptive right to refuse
to sell or license products incorporating the IP to competitors. In a case involving Xeroxs
refusal to sell patented replacement parts and copyrighted service manuals to competing
service providers in the copier repair market, the Federal Circuit ruled, upholding a lower
courts decision, that such refusal to deal by the IP holder does not violate antitrust laws.
A¢ rming a more general principle, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Trinko (2004) that
rms have no antitrust duty to share their property (or source of advantage), in this case
telecommunications network, with competitors.1 In Europe, however, competition authori-
ties and courts have in several inuential cases found that it is a violation of competition law
for a dominant rm to refuse to supply certain information, a special type of intermediate
good under IP protection, to downstream rivals, as in Magill (1995), IMS (2004) and, more
recently, the much publicized EC microsoft case.2
The wide divergence of court opinions across the Atlantic poses important challenges to
economists.3 In a thought-provoking recent article, Vickers (2010) states: (the case exam-
ples illustrate that) tension between competition principles and property right principles,
as well as their intrinsic interest, are economic policy questions of the rst order of impor-
1For these two cases, see respectively: CSU L.L.C., et al. v. Xerox Corp., Fed. Cir., No. 99-1323,
decided February 17, 2000; and Verizon Communications Inc v Law O¢ ces of Curtis V. Trinko LLP, 540
US 398 (2004).
2RTE, ITP & BBC v. Commission, 1995 E.C.R. II-485; Case C-418/01, IMS Health v. NDC Health,
2004 E.C.R. I-5039; and Microsoft v Commission, T-201/04, 2007. See Vickers (2010) for more discussions.
3Even in the U.S., the issue remains controversial. Earlier court cases have imposed antitrust lia-
bility for unilateral refusal to deal, as, for example, in Aspen Skiing v. Aspen Highlands Skiing, 472
U.S. 585 (1985), and Eastman Kodak v. Image Technical Servs, 504 U.S. 451 (1992). In fact, ac-
cording to the U.S. Federal Trade Commission, One of the most unsettled areas of antitrust law has
to do with the duty of a monopolist to deal with its competitors. (FTC Guide to the Antitrust Laws,
http://www.ftc.gov/bc/antitrust/refusal_to_deal.shtm, accessed on February 23, 2011.)
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tance.The purpose of this paper, inspired by Vickers, is to clarify the economic logic of
refusal to deal and to evaluate the economic merits of alternative policies concerning such
conduct, focusing on the especially controversial case where the monopolists intermediate
good is produced with IP created through innovation.
The rst step in my analysis, rather than inquiring whether antitrust law should compel a
monopolist to supply a rival, addresses a more basic question that has not been well under-
stood in the economics literature and policy discussions: why would a monopolist refuse to
supply a rival? One answer, implicit in arguments advocating an antitrust liability, is that
the monopolist seeks to extend its monopoly power from the upstream to the downstream
market. The Chicago School, however, would dispute the plausibility of such anticompet-
itive vertical foreclosure, based on the logic of there being only one monopoly prot (which
implicitly assumes a perfectly competitive downstream market). When the downstream
market is not perfectly competitive, the one-monopoly logic is generally not correct: by
charging its monopoly price for the input, the upstream monopolist could extract surplus
from e¢ cient downstream competitors, which provides a second source of prot to the mo-
nopolist but can sometimes also lead to ine¢ cient foreclosures.4 But this only adds to the
puzzle: if a monopolist can potentially extract surplus from supplying a downstream rival,
why would it refuse to deal?5
The solution to this puzzle, as I shall argue, is to consider dynamic incentives in the verti-
cal industry structure. Although the upstream monopolist has the monopoly power for the
input now, there might be a future follow-on innovation by another rm that creates a bet-
terinput. By not supplying the downstream rival now, the monopolist may either reduce
this possibility or maintain monopoly prot through downstream dominance even when the
upstream market becomes competitive. This strategic, or anticompetitivemotive, may
outweigh the short-term benets of surplus extraction from supplying the downstream com-
petitors. Thus, anticompetitive refusal to supply a downstream rival may indeed occur, but
4See, for example, Vickers (2010), who also points out that this is related to Aghion and Bolton (1987)s
classic analysis on how exclusive contracts can be protably used to extract surplus from potential entrants.
5One could, of course, resort to explanations based on transaction costs or contracting failures, which we
should discuss shortly, but the puzzle for the argument favouring an antitrust liability still is: where is the
anticompetitive motive for refusal to deal?
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only when future upstream competition from follow-on innovation is (su¢ ciently) likely.
This potential anticompetitive motive, however, should be considered in the context of
other potential motives when evaluating an antitrust liability for refusal to deal. There
might be additional xed (setup or transaction) cost to supply the downstream rival, relative
to supplying ones own downstream producer. When the variable prots under monopoly
pricing is not high enough to cover such costs, the monopolist will nd it optimal to refrain
from supplying the rival. I shall call this the cost motive,6 which may include related reasons
such as bargaining or contracting failures.7 I develop an analytical framework in which the
strategic and cost motives can be disentangled and assessed. I further demonstrate how
these motives are a¤ected by the prevailing IP protection and how they in turn a¤ect the
equilibrium market structure.
After clarifying the economic logic of refusal to deal, I next study the consumer and
social welfare e¤ects of three antitrust policies: prohibiting a monopolists refusal to deal,
restricting the monopolists input price but without prohibiting refusal to deal, or both
prohibiting refusal to deal and restricting the input price. The initial upstream innovation
incentive is taken into account, in addition to the subsequent strategic interactions in the
industry. I nd that prohibiting refusal to deal leads to (weakly) lower consumer and social
welfare when future follow-on innovation is su¢ ciently unlikely, but to (weakly) higher
consumer and social welfare when both transaction and innovation costs are small enough.
On the other hand, restricting input price alone, in the form of imposing the e¢ cient
component pricing rule (ECPR), always leads to (weakly) lower consumer welfare, whereas
prohibiting refusal to deal together with ECPR can either increase or reduce consumer and
social welfare.
I further consider how the two di¤erent aspects of intellectual property rights (IPRs), the
strength of IP protection (as determined by IP laws) and possible restrictions on IP holders
conduct (as determined by antitrust laws), may interact to a¤ect innovation incentives and
6 It is well known that market transactions can involve additional transaction costs (e.g., Williamson,
1980).
7Contracting failure might occur when the monopolist is unable to charge its prot-maximizing price. In
the absence of strategic considerations, the monopolist generally could do better by charging this price than
refusal to deal, since the latter is equivalent to a su¢ ciently (innitely) high price.
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post-innovation market performance. In particular, I show that IP protection and antitrust
are partial substitutes as policy instruments in promoting consumer welfare: the desirability
for restrictive antitrust policies (i.e., prohibiting refusal to deal) is reduced under strong IP
protection (for the initial innovation); and, conversely, strong IP protection becomes less
desirable under restrictive antitrust policies.
This research is related to the economics literature on tying and foreclosure. In his
seminal contribution, Whinston (1990) demonstrates that a monopolist in one market can
use tied sales to foreclose competition in another market. Whinstons analysis focuses on
the monopolists ability to use tying to induce exit of a rival in the tied market so as
to increase current protability there. Carlton and Waldman (2001) introduce important
dynamic considerations and show that a monopolist in its primary market can use tying of
a complementary product to maintain its monopoly position by deterring future entry into
the primary market. In their two-period model, this occurs because tying can eliminate the
competitors prot and thus deter it from producing the complementary product in period 1,
and entry to the primary market in period 2 then becomes unprotable to the competitor.8
My analysis is closely related to these studies, since refusal to deal also excludes competition.
However, in addition to refusal to deal being a di¤erent business practice that is still much
debated and less understood, both the model and the potential anticompetitive mechanism
uncovered here have important di¤erences from those in the tying literature. In particular,
unlike under tying where goods from both markets are sold directly to nal consumers, in
my model of vertical markets the input is sold to (and used by) downstream producer(s)
who then supply nal consumers. As such, vertical control is a key element of the potential
anticompetitive mechanism under refusal to deal, which enables the input monopolist to
earn monopoly industry prot even when the upstream market becomes competitive in the
future.9
This paper is also related to other studies on antitrust in innovative industries, partic-
ularly Segal and Whinston (2007), who in a setting of continual innovation analyze how
8See also Choi and Stefanadis (2001) for another important model of dynamic foreclosure through tying.
9Another major di¤erence is that my explicit consideration of innovation incentives and of coordinating
IP and antitrust policies.
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antitrust policies restricting incumbent behavior towards horizontally competing entrants
a¤ect innovation incentives. By considering a model of vertical industry competition and
the interactions between IPRs and antitrust, this study introduces new considerations and
complements their analysis.10 The research is further related to the literature on vertical
foreclosure (e.g., Ordover, Saloner, and Salop, 1990; Choi and Yi, 2000; and Chen, 2001).
My nding, that a vertically integrated rm may refuse to supply a downstream rival in
order to maintain vertical control in the presence of potential upstream competition, adds
a new insight to the literature.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 formulates a stylized continuous-
time model where initially a rm can invent a new intermediate good (input) through
investment. Section 3 analyzes the market equilibrium, considering both the innovation
decision and post-innovation strategic interactions. Section 4 studies the consumer and
social welfare e¤ects of antitrust policies that prohibit refusal to deal and/or restrict the
monopolists pricing for the input. Section 5 analyzes possible optimal coordination of IP
protection and antitrust. Section 6 discusses several modeling issues, possible extensions,
and case examples. Section 7 concludes. Proofs that do not appear in the text are gathered
in an appendix.
2. THE MODEL
There are two vertically related industries, U and D. A vertically integrated rm, M; has
an upstream division denoted as U1 and a downstream division denoted as D1. Time is
continuous. At t = 0, U1 has an opportunity to invent a new intermediate good by invest-
ing k > 0:11 The strength of intellectual property protection for the innovation, possibly
through a patent or copyright, is denoted by  2 [0; 1] ; where a higher  indicates stronger
protection, with 0 and 1 corresponding respectively to no protection and perfect protection.
10See also Scotchmer (2004) for important discussions about IPRs and competition policy, and Chen and
Sappington (2011) on how exclusive contracts a¤ect innovation and welfare.
11We may think the innovation opportunity as the arrival of an innovation idea, which needs the investment
cost k to implement, as in Green and Scotchmer (1995). The investment cost can be the realization of some
random variable; for our purpose we shall treat it as a parameter of the model.
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The intermediate good, whose marginal cost of production is normalized to zero, can be
used to produce a homogeneous retail (nal) product in D by D1 or/and by a separate rm,
D2. The production of the nal product uses the input through a one-to-one xed proportion
technology. The downstream production by D1 has instantaneous constant marginal cost
c; whereas production by D2 has uncertain instantaneous constant marginal cost c2; which
for any t  0 is an independent draw of a random variable distributed with c.d.f. F (c2)
and p.d.f. f (c2) > 0 on [c; c] ; where 0  c  c < c:12 At t = 0; U1 chooses whether to o¤er
the intermediate good for sale to D2. If it does, U1 incurs a one-time setup cost   0 in
order to transact with D2, and then posts wholesale price w to D2, which can be adjusted
instantaneously at any t > 0:13 To provide a meaningful and convenient analysis of antitrust
restrictions on U1s actions, we assume that D2 can enter the market only if U1 chooses
to supply D2 at t = 0.14 The discount rate for all parties is r: All rms aim to maximize
expected prots.
An independent rm in U, U2; may arrive after t = 0 with a follow-on innovation to
produce a higher-quality input at a marginal cost also normalized to zero. U2s innovation
is possible only if U1 innovates at t = 0: The arrival time of U2 follows a Poisson distribution
with arrival rate  () > 0; where 0 ()  0 to capture the idea that a follow-on innovation
is more likely when there is less IP protection for the initial innovation. For given ; we
simply denote this arrival rate by .15 By using U2s input, active downstream producers,
which include D1 and possibly D2 if D2 has also been an active producer, will have a lower
marginal cost of downstream production, cL; with cL  c:When both U1 and U2 are present
12Thus D1 and D2 each may have a cost advantage at di¤erent points of time. This is a convenient
way to introduce a potentially e¢ cient reason to have both rms in the market, even though they produce
a homogeneous product. We could allow D1 and D2 to produce di¤erentiated products or to both have
uncertain costs, but these alternative settings would be less tractable than the formulation we adopt here.
13The setup cost may be due to technical specications or adjustments that need to be made to the input
for use by D2. For the main model, we only consider linear input prices, same as for the nal good. We
later discuss how to extend the analysis to situations where general vertical contracts are feasible.
14Thus U1 can exclude D2 by not supplying it at t = 0. This could be the case, for example, if U1 can
commit to its decision through some irreversible technical choice in its product design at t = 0 (as in Choi
and Yi, 2000). Then, it could be optimal for D2 not to enter even in a more general model where the entry
decision is explicitly analyzed. We shall discuss this issue further in Section 6.
15Our analysis extends to situations where D2 and U2 belong to a vertically integrated rm, or where 
is higher when U1 supplies D2. These possibilities, which could strengthen the strategic motive for U1 not
to supply D2, are not modeled here for ease of exposition, but will be discussed later.
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in U, they post instantaneous spot market prices w1 and w2 to the downstream producer(s):
The instantaneous demand function in D is Q (p) ; where Q0 (p)  0: Price is the strategic
variable of downstream rms, which is set at every instant after input price(s) are determined
and observed. If both D1 and D2 are active, they compete by choosing prices p1 and p2
simultaneously. Consumers purchase from the rm with the lower price, and if the prices
are equal, the rm with the lower opportunity cost makes the sale.16
U1s decision at t = 0 on whether to supply D2 may be subject to antitrust restrictions.
We consider three potential antitrust policies:  2 x; y; z	 ; where x refers to the
requirement that U1 cannot refuse to deal with any independent downstream producer
(but no restriction on the terms of trade is specied); y refers to the requirement that,
if U1 sells to a downstream competitor (which is however not required), then w should be
determined by the e¢ cient component pricing rule (ECPR);17 and z refers to an obligation
for U1 to o¤er the input for sale to any downstream competitor at a price determined by
ECPR.
Both  and  are assumed to have been chosen prior to t = 0; and we shall analyze how
they a¤ect market outcomes: Taking  and  as given parameters, we summarize the timing
of the game as follows:
At t = 0: U1 rst decides whether to incur k to innovate. If it does not, the game ends
with zero payo¤ to all parties. Otherwise, the game continues with U1 choosing whether to
o¤er its input for sale to D2.18
 If U1 chooses to supply D2, it incurs setup cost  and posts input price w, and D2
enters the market. D2s instantaneous cost c2 is then realized and known to both D1
and D2, after which D1 and D2 simultaneously post their instantaneous prices p1 and
p2; and nal output is produced to meet the instantaneous demand.
16The input prices w; w1; and w2; as well as the prices for the nal product, p1 and p2; will depend on
state variables such as market structures and costs, but will not directly depend on time. They are therefore
not written as functions of t:
17As discussed in Vickers (2010) in the context of access pricing, under ECPR the w charged by U1 to D2
covers U1s direct (marginal) cost to supply D2 plus the opportunity cost (in terms of foregone prot) from
doing so.
18 If U1 is indi¤erent between innovation or no innovation, we assume that it chooses innovation; and if
U1 is indi¤erent between supplying and not supplying D2, we assume that it chooses to supply D2.
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 Otherwise, D2 permanently stays out of the market. D1 posts its instantaneous price,
p1:
At any t > 0:
 Before the arrival of U2: If only D1 is in downstream, it sets its monopoly price at every
instant. If D2 is also present, U1 rst sets w for D2,19 after which D2s instantaneous
cost c2 is realized and known to both D1 and D2, who then simultaneously post p1
and p2.
 After the arrival of U2: If only D1 is in D, U2 posts w2 to D1, who chooses whether
to purchase from U2 or to use input from U1; D1 then sets its monopoly price at
every instant t. If D2 is also in the market, U1 and U2 rst simultaneously post
instantaneous input prices w1 and w2: D2s instantaneous cost c2 is then realized and
known to both D1 and D2, who choose where to purchase the input and simultaneously
post p1 and p2:
3. MARKET EQUILIBRIUM
This section derives equilibrium rm strategies and market structures, as well as consumer
and social welfare, when there is no antitrust restriction (i.e.,  = o). We rst study
equilibrium outcomes assuming that U1 has innovated the new input, considering in turn
cases where U1 does not supply D2 and where U1 does. We then characterize equilibrium
market structure, considering both U1s incentive to supply D2 and its initial incentive to
innovate. Let
p (~c)  argmax
p
(p  ~c)Q (p) (1)
be the prot-maximizing price for a static monopoly with marginal cost ~c facing demand
Q (p) : Dene
p0  p (c) ; 0   p0   cQ  p0 ; v0 = Z 1
p0
Q (p) dp: (2)
19Alternatively, it keeps the same w from t = 0; until it nds optimal to change it.
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We make the following assumptions to simplify analysis:
A1. For any ~c 2 [0; c]: (i) p (~c) exists uniquely and (p  ~c)Q (p) increases in p for p < p (~c) ;
and (ii) p (~c)  2~c:
A2. [c  cL]F (c)Q (c)  0:
For A1, part (i) is standard and self-explaining, and part (ii) is satised if c is not too high
relative to demand. A2 is also satised as long as c is not too high relative to demand
and/or F (c) is relatively small. These two assumptions will be used in proving Lemmas
1-2 and deriving equilibrium downstream prices.20
3.1 Without D2 In the Downstream Market
Suppose that U1 chooses not to supply D2 at t = 0. Then, D2 is excluded from the
market for t  0: Before U2 arrives, Ms downstream price and its prot at any t will be p0
and 0: After U2 arrives, U2 will optimally o¤er w2 = c  cL to D1, which implies that Ms
instantaneous price and prot at any t will still be p0 and 0; whereas U2 earns instanta-
neous prot 0U2 = (c  cL)Q
 
p0

: Thus, the instantaneous consumer welfare is always v0;
whereas the instantaneous social welfare prior to and after U2s arrival, respectively, are:
s01 = 
0 + v0; s02 = 
0 + 0U2 + v
0 > s01: (3)
Therefore, without selling to D2, the discounted sum of Ms prot is
0M =
Z 1
0
e rte t

0 + 0=r

dt =
0 + 0=r
r + 
=
0
r
: (4)
20We could simplify the model by assuming that consumers have unit demand with some reservation
value, as is often done in the innovation literature. Then, both A1 and A2 are trivially satised when c is
not too high relative to the reservation value. A general downward-slopping demand curve, as we assume
here, introduces consumer gain from innovation even under monopoly, and thus permits a richer and more
realistic consumer and social welfare analysis.
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The discounted sums of consumer welfare and social welfare are, respectively:21
V 0 =
v0
r
; S0 =
s01 + s
0
2=r
r + 
: (5)
We note that without D2 in the market, Ms prot and consumer welfare both are indepen-
dent of : The follow-on upstream innovation, if it is successful, does not increase consumer
welfare as the downstream monopoly price remains unchanged, but it does increase social
welfare due to higher industry prot.
3.2 With D2 In the Downstream Market
Next suppose that U1 chooses to supply D2 at t = 0, so that D2 is in the downstream
market for t  0: We consider in turn two cases: before and after U2s arrival.
Equilibrium before U2s Arrival. If U1s price for D2 is w; the opportunity cost for D1
is w+c: If w+c2  min

p0; w + c
	
; D2 makes the sale at price min

p0; w + c
	
; otherwise,
D1 makes the sale at pricemin

p0; w + c2
	
. Thus U1s prot is wQ
 
min

p (w + c2) ; p
0; c+ w
	
:
Denote U1s equilibrium intermediate good price for D2 and the equilibrium downstream
market price by wa and pa; respectively. We have:
Lemma 1 In the presence of D2 and before the arrival of U2, pa = p0; Ms instantaneous
equilibrium prot is
aM = 
0

1  F  p0   wa+ waQ  p0F  p0   wa > 0; (6)
where wa 2  po   c; p0   c solves

0   waQ  p0 f  p0   wa+Q  p0F  p0   wa = 0: (7)
Because D2 sometimes has a lower (marginal) cost than D1, M can achieve a higher
21When no confusion would arise, in what follows we shall simply say Ms prot, consumer welfare, and
social welfare when referring to their respective discounted sums.
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instantaneous prot by selling to D2 at an input price exceeding U1s opportunity cost
(p0   c). Since pa = p0; the presence of downstream competition in this case does not
increase consumer welfare, but industry prot is higher due to both the higher prot for M,
aM ; and the prot for D2, 
a
D2; where
aD2 =
Z p0 wa
c

p0   wa   c2

Q
 
p0

f (c2) dc2 = Q
 
p0
 Z p0 wa
c
F (c2) dc2 > 0:
The instantaneous consumer and social welfare are va = v0 and sa = aM + 
a
D2 + v
0:
Equilibrium after U2s Arrival. U1 and U2 simultaneously o¤er w1 > 0 and w2 > 0;
where without loss of generality w2  c  cL; because otherwise U2 would have no sales.
If w1 + c2  w2 + cL; D2 will purchase from U1, the equilibrium downstream price
will be min fp (w2 + cL) ; w1 + w2 + cLg ; since D1 stands ready to purchase from U2 at
w2  c   cL to supply either at price w1 + w2 + cL (which includes U1s opportunity cost
w1 when D1 takes away the sale from D2), or at price p (w2 + cL) ; whichever is smaller.
Both U1 and D2 will earn positive prots: Furthermore, since w2 + cL  c; from A1 we
have p (w2 + cL)  2 (w2 + cL) ; and since 2 (w2 + cL) > (w1 + w2 + cL) ; it follows that
p (w2 + cL) > w1 + w2 + cL. The equilibrium price in D is thus pb = w1 + w2 + cL:
On the other hand, if w1+ c2 > w2+ cL; D2 will purchase from U2 at w2; the equilibrium
price in D will be pb = w2 + cL; since D1, observing c2 and knowing that D2 will purchase
from U2, stands ready to purchase from U2 at w2 and to sell to nal consumers at price
w2 + cL: Both M and D2 earn zero while U2 earns positive prot:22
Notice that since c2  cL by assumption, in equilibrium w1  w2; otherwise M and D1 will
always earn zero prot (in which case w1 is not optimal). Thus, denoting the equilibrium
input prices of U1 and U2 by wb1 and w
b
2; we have w
b
1  wb2  c   cL; and the equilibrium
22 If D2 could commit to purchasing its input from U1 at price w1; then D2 could price its product at
w1 +w2 + cL; which could lead to positive prots for U1 and D2 even if w1 + c2 > w2 + cL. Without such a
commitment, however, it is only optimal for D2 to purchase from the supplier with a lower total cost, and
knowing that, D1 and D2 will engage in Bertrand price competition leading to price w2 + cL.
11
downstream market price is
pb =
8<: wb1 + wb2 + cL if wb1 + c2  wb2 + cLwb2 + cL if wb1 + c2 > wb2 + cL : (8)
The expected instantaneous prots for M (through U1) and U2 are:
M (w1; w2) = w1F (w2   w1 + cL)Q (w1 + w2 + cL) ;
U2 (w1; w2) = w2 [1  F (w2   w1 + cL)]Q (w2 + cL) :
(9)
The equilibrium wb1 > 0 and w
b
2 > 0 are assumed to exist and to satisfy rst-order con-
ditions @M (w1; w2) =@w1 = 0 and @U2 (w1; w2) =@w2 = 0.23 Denote the equilibrium
instantaneous prot for M, U2, and D2, as well as consumer and social welfare by bM ; 
b
U2;
bD2; v
b; and sb; respectively. Then:
Lemma 2 (i) aM > 
o > bM ; (ii) p
b < po = pa; vb > va = vo; (iii) sb > sa > so1; and (iv)
bU2 > 
o
U2 and s
b > so2 if
[1  F (c)]Q (c)  Q (po) ; (10)
but sb < so2 if kQ0 (p)k ! 0 for p  po.
When D1 is a downstream monopoly, M can maintain industry monopoly prot (o)
through vertical control even when there is upstream competition. But when D2 is also
present, M can no longer attain the original monopoly prot when facing competition in U
(bM < 
0). Thus, despite aM > 
0; if the follow-on innovation in U is likely, U1 will prefer
not to supply D2.
The presence of D2 lowers downstream market price, increasing U2s sales. But it also
lowers U2s price, due to competition from U1. Condition (10), which would be satised if
demand is not too inelastic and c not too high, ensures that the output e¤ect dominates so
that bU2 > 
0
U2.
23For example, if c = 0:5; F (c2) = c2 on [0; 1] ; Q (p) = 2   p; and cL = 0; then wb1 = 0:222 72 and
wb2 = 0:492 14.
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Instantaneous social welfare is the highest in the presence of both D2 and U2, is lower
without U2, and is the lowest without both D2 and U2, as industry production costs increase
in the order of these market structures. The comparison between sb and s02; instantaneous
social welfare in the presence of both U2 and D2 and that when U2 is present but D2 is
not, is generally ambiguous. With U2 in the market, the presence of D2 lowers equilibrium
downstream price, which has a positive impact on output and social welfare, but it some-
times causes nal output to be produced using U1s input, resulting in higher production
cost, which has a negative impact on social welfare. The positive output expansion ef-
fect on social welfare dominates when condition (10) holds, whereas the negative output
diversione¤ect dominates if kQ0 (p)k ! 0 for p  p0.24
If U1 chooses to supply D2 at t = 0; Ms post-innovation equilibrium prot, consumer
welfare, and social welfare are respectively:
dM =
aM + 
b
M=r
r + 
   ; V d = v
o + vb=r
r + 
; Sd =
sa + sb=r
r + 
   ; (11)
where dM decreases in  but V
d increases in ; with the e¤ect of  on Sd generally am-
biguous.
3.3 Equilibrium Market Structure and Innovation
We now determine the equilibrium market structure and Ms innovation decision. First,
we ask when U1 will choose to supply D2 in a market equilibrium, given its innovation.
Comparing 0M and 
d
M from (4) and (11), recalling 
a
M > 
0 > bM ; and noticing that
aM ; 
0; and bM are all nite and independent of  and ; we immediately have:
Proposition 1 U1 will supply D2 if and only if 
aM   0

(r + )
  
 
0   bM

r (r + )
  : (12)
24Reduction of social welfare due to entry can also occur in other models, but it is often due to the
existence of entry cost (e.g., Mankiw and Whinston, 1986) Here the entry of D2 can reduce social welfare
even when there is no entry cost, because it results in the use of a less e¢ cient input.
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In particular, as ! 0; U1 will supply D2 if  <  aM   0 =r but not if  >  aM   0 =r;
and as  ! 0; U1 will supply D2 if  <  but not if  > ; where
  r  aM   0 =0   bM : (13)
Therefore, when there is no potential competition for U1s IP (i.e., ! 0); U1 will supply
D2 so long as the setup cost to do so is not too high. In this case, U1 increases prot by
supplying D2, since it can share some of the surplus created when D2 has lower cost. On
the other hand, if potential competition from U2 is su¢ ciently likely ( > ); U1 will not
supply D2 even if there is little xed cost to do so. Thus, it is the potential competition
from the creation of alternative IP, not competition among IP users, that may motivate
refusal to deal.
Notice that if supplying D2 leads to a higher , then condition (12) will be more di¢ cult
to hold.25 We thus have:
Remark 1 U1 will have a stronger incentive for refusal to deal if supplying D2 raises .
There are several possible reasons why presence of D2 may make the follow-on innovation
more likely, or  higher for any given . One possibility is that D2 might obtain technical
information from U1, which could have a positive spillover e¤ect on U2s follow-on inno-
vation. Alternatively, because the presence of D2 tends to increase U2s prot from the
follow-on innovation, U2 is more likely to bring the innovation to the market if doing so
involves some xed cost.
We next compare consumer and social welfare with or without D2. Consumer surplus is
higher with D2 than without D2, because the arrival of U2 benets consumers only when
D2 is present (recall vb > va   v0 from Lemma 2). However, as  ! 0; consumer welfare
under the two market structures becomes approximately the same, as can be seen from
(5) and (11). When (10) holds, the presence of D2 increases instantaneous social welfare,
and hence also increases social welfare if transaction cost  is small; but U1s supplying D2
25Recall that 0M is independent of  while 
d
M decreases in : Hence, in condition (12),  corresponds
to the arrival rate of follow-on innovation when D2 is present in the downstream market.
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would reduce social welfare when  is high enough, as is apparent from (11). We thus have:
Proposition 2 (i) V d > V 0; and V d ! V 0 as  ! 0: (ii) Sd > S0 if  ! 0 and (10)
holds, but Sd < S0 if  is large enough.
Finally, we consider U1s initial innovation decision in the input market. U1 will innovate
if and only if k  maxoM ;dM	. Thus, innovation will occur if k is not too large. Let 

be any set of parameter values and dene the indicator function
I
 =
8<: 1 if the parameter values belong to 
0 otherwise : (14)
Then, without antitrust restriction on U1, in equilibrium Ms prot, consumer welfare, and
social welfare are respectively:
M = IdMmaxf0M ;kg

dM   k

+ If0Mkg\f0M>dMg
 
0M   k

;
V  = IdMmaxf0M ;kgV
d + If0Mkg\f0M>dMgV
0; (15)
S = IdMmaxf0M ;kg

Sd   k

+ If0Mkg\f0M>dMg
 
S0   k :
4. WELFARE EFFECTS OF ANTITRUST POLICIES
We now consider the three potential antitrust policies that restrict the exercise of IPRs
by U1: x; y, and z. These restrictions can potentially a¤ect both U1s incentives to
create the intellectual property and the post-innovation market outcomes.
First, under x; U1 is required to supply D2 but there is no restriction on U1s pricing.
Denote Ms prot, consumer welfare and social welfare under x by 
x
M ; V
x and Sx:We
have:
xM = IdMk

dM   k

; V x = IdMkV
d; Sx = IdMk

Sd   k

: (16)
Proposition 3 Holding everything else constant: (i) V x / V  if  ! 0 or if  is large
enough; V x < V  and Sx < S if  is large enough and k  0M : (ii) V x > V  if  > 
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while k and  are both su¢ ciently small, and Sx > S if in addition (10) holds.
If follow-on innovation is su¢ ciently unlikely, consumer welfare will be roughly the same
with or without the presence of D2. Forcing U1 to supply D2 by x; however, could cause
U1 to switch from innovation to no innovation, resulting in (substantial) losses to both
consumer and social welfare. On the other hand, if  > , U1 would choose to supply D2
only under x; and, when k and  both small enough, U1 will indeed supply D2 under
x; implying that x increases consumer welfare. On social welfare, there is the additional
complication that the presence of D2 generally has ambiguous impact due to the conicting
output expansion and diversion e¤ects. If (10) holds, however, instantaneous social welfare is
higher in the presence of D2, and thus x improves social welfare when the other conditions
are satised. Notice that x can increase social welfare only when it would reduce Ms
equilibrium prot.
Next, under y; U1, when it is the only upstream seller and chooses to supply D2, is
required to charge D2 no more than w = p0   c .26 In this case, if U1 supplies D2, Ms
instantaneous prot is 0 before the arrival of U2 and bM < 
0 thereafter. Thus, M is always
better o¤ not to supply D2, which will be its equilibrium choice. If max

k;0M
	
> dM ;
then y will have no e¤ect on consumer and social welfare. But if max

k;0M
	  dM ; U1
would have supplied D2 without y; and thus y reduces consumer welfare since V
0 < V d;
and if additionally (10) holds so that s0 < sd; then y also reduces social welfare. Denote
the consumer welfare and social welfare under y by V
y and Sy; respectively, we thus have:
Proposition 4 (i) V y  V ; and V y < V if maxk;0M	  dM : (ii) Suppose that (10)
holds. Then, Sy  S; and Sy < S if maxk;0M	  dM :
Thus, ECPR (weakly) reduces consumer welfare, and it also (weakly) reduces social wel-
fare if (10) holds. It is important to note that antitrust policies may change the equilibrium
market structure, which is determined endogenously in our model. ECPR leads to lower
consumer and social welfare in our model, not only because it may discourage innovation
26This assumes that under ECPR, w does not incorporate U1s possible xed setup cost  :
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by reducing innovation returns, but also because it can result in a post-innovation market
structure that is unfavorable to consumer and social welfare.
Finally, under z; if U1 is the upstream monopoly supplier, U1 will be required to supply
D2 at price wz = po   c, the downstream equilibrium price is po; and instantaneous prots
for M and D2 are respectively zaM = 
0 < dM and
zaD2 =
Z c
c
(c  c2)Q
 
p0

f (c2) dc2 > 
a
D2;
with instantaneous consumer and social welfare vza = v0 and sza  0 + zaD2 + v0 > sa.
After U2s arrival, the outcome is the same as under x: Let
^zM 
0 + bM=r
+ r
   ; zM = I^zMk

dM   k

;
V z = I^zMk
v0 + vb
+ r
; Sz = I^zMk

sza + sb=r
+ r
  

; (17)
where zM ; V
z; and Sz denote Ms prot, consumer surplus, and social surplus at the
equilibrium under z. Similarly as under x; we have:
Proposition 5 Holding everything else constant: (i) V z / V  if  ! 0 or if  is large
enough; V z < V  and Sz < S if  is large enough and k  oM : (ii) V z > V  if k and 
are both small enough but  > ^, and Sz > S if in addition (10) holds.
If a follow-on innovation in U is su¢ ciently unlikely, consumer welfare would be roughly
the same with or without the presence of D2. If  is large, U1 would innovate only if it
does not supply D2. In both cases, z could lower consumer and social welfare by causing
U1 to abandon innovation, similarly as x: On the other hand, if k and  are both small
enough but  is high enough, U1 will innovate under z; and z also changes the post-
innovation market structure from downstream monopoly to downstream duopoly, with the
latter providing higher consumer welfare, and, if in addition (10) holds, also higher social
welfare.
While y is clearly dominated by o in terms of consumer welfare (and also of social
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welfare if (10) holds), both x and z can either raise or lower consumer and social welfare.
The relative desirability of x and z depends on the welfare measures. Given U1s innova-
tion, consumer welfare is the same under x and z; while social welfare is higher under z
than under x (due to higher production e¢ ciency under z): But since Ms post-innovation
prot is higher under x than under z; the initial innovation incentive is higher under the
former: We thus have:
Corollary 1 (i) V x  V z; and V x > V z for a set of intermediate values of k. (ii) Sx < Sz
if k is su¢ ciently small, but Sx  Sz for a set of intermediate values of k:
Therefore, among the three antitrust policies, x results in (weakly) higher consumer
welfare than either y or z.
27 Social welfare, however, can be either higher or lower under
x than under z:
Furthermore, if competition is only among potential (downstream) IP users ( ! 0),
then none of the three potential antitrust policies would benet consumers, and they may
substantially reduce consumer welfare, by causing U1 either to abandon the innovation, or
to switch to a market structure with lower post-innovation consumer welfare.
5. COORDINATION OF IP PROTECTION AND ANTITRUST
We now endogenize the strength of IP protection, : Antitrust and IP protection both
can potentially increase consumer welfare and possibly also social welfare. We are interested
in how they can be optimally coordinated to achieve this policy objective. In particular,
should antitrust and IP protection be substitutes or complements? That is, does the optimal
strength in one policy increase or decrease in the strength of the other policy? For antitrust
policies, we shall only consider x and z; as y is (weakly) dominated by no antitrust
restriction.
Since 0 () < 0 in our model, stronger IP protection, or a higher ; implies that follow-on
innovation by U2 is less likely. If the downstream market structure is duopoly, then
27Again, this is because restricting input prices through ECPR does not lower the downstream monopoly
price for nal consumers, but can hurt consumers when the reduced prot of the innovating rm due to the
restriction causes the rm to abandon the innovation.
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@dM
@
=
bM   aM
(r + )2
0 () > 0;
@V d
@
=
vb   v0
(r + )2
0 () < 0;
@Sd
@
=
sb   sa
(r + )2
0 () < 0:
Ms prot is higher with stronger IP protection when there is downstream competition,
because stronger IP protection delays the expected arrival of the upstream competitor and
prolongs Ms monopoly in the input market. This, however, reduces consumer and social
welfare. Thus stronger IP protection here involves the usual trade-o¤ between providing
innovation incentive and increasing post-innovation consumer and social welfare.
On the other hand, if D1 is a downstream monopoly, then
@0M
@
= 0;
@V 0
@
= 0;
@S0
@
=
0U2
(r + )2
0 () < 0:
When M has monopoly position in the downstream market, its prot (0M ) is not reduced
by the arrival of an upstream competitor. Thus, changes in ; which only a¤ects  (or
how fast U2 is expected to arrive), have no e¤ect on Ms prot.28 Since D1 will charge the
same monopoly price to nal consumers, with or without U2, consumer welfare is also not
a¤ected by : Industry prot is higher after U2s arrival, due to lower production cost, and
thus a higher  that delays the arrival of U2 reduces social welfare.
The result below describes how  a¤ects consumer and social welfare as well as how the
e¤ects may depend on antitrust restrictions.
Proposition 6 (i) Consumer welfare and/or social welfare decreases in  if k is su¢ ciently
small. (ii) Without antitrust restriction, consumer welfare increases in  if the higher 
results in the change from dM < max

0M ; k
	
to dM  max

0M ; k
	
; under x or z;
consumer and social welfare increase in  if the higher  results in the change from dM < k
to dM  k or from ^zM < k to ^zM  k; respectively:
28For convenience, we have maintained the assumption that upstream rms post prices to downstream
producers, which gives all the bargaining power to the upstream rms. More realistically, when D1 is the
only rm downstream, it may also have some bargaining power. Then, oM would actually be higher if IP
protection () is lower, as M could share some of the e¢ ciency gains due to the arrival of U2.
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Without antitrust restrictions, a higher  can reduce consumer and social welfare by
delaying the follow-on innovation, but it can potentially increase consumer and social welfare
in two ways: increasing innovation incentive (when the downstream market has a duopoly),
and making it more likely that U1 will choose to supply D2 post innovation (so that the
downstream market is a duopoly).
If there is antitrust restriction that prohibits refusal-to-deal, with or without the addi-
tional requirement of ECPR, then the potential welfare benet of a higher  is reduced,
because it no longer has the potential benet to motivate U1 to supply D2, since the an-
titrust restriction has already ensured a downstream duopoly, if U1 innovates. In this sense,
restrictive antitrust can partially substitute for strong IP protection.
Interestingly, strong IP protection can also partially substitute for antitrust restriction,
as in the following:
Proposition 7 Suppose that  ! 0 when  ! 1 and  > ^ when  < ^ for some
^ 2 (0; 1) : Then: (i) When ! 1, antitrust, in the form of x or z; has little or negative
impact on consumer welfare (i.e., V x / V ; V z / V ). (ii) When  < ^, antitrust, in the
form of x or z; will increase consumer welfare if k and  are small enough, and will also
increase social welfare if additionally (10) holds.
When IP protection is strong enough, U1 has little concern for future competition from
potential follow-on innovation. U1 thus has no anticompetitive motive to exclude D2
it will choose to supply D2 to achieve a higher prot if the xed cost to supply D2,  ;
is relatively small. Furthermore, due to U1s monopoly upstream price, the nal prices
for consumers are the same with or without downstream competition, and thus antitrust
has little benet to consumers even if it does not cause reduction in innovation, but will
substantially lower consumer welfare if it causes U1 to abandon the innovation.29
When IP protection is relatively weak, U1 is likely to face future competition from the
29Even without an anticompetitive motive, U1s decision on whether to supply D2 may not maximize
social welfare, as U1 does not internalize D2s prot. But the purpose of antitrust is not to protect or
benet competitors. Furthermore, an antitrust liability for U1 to supply D2 could also reduce welfare if the
resulting lower prot discourages U1 to innovate.
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follow-on innovation. U1 thus has an anticompetitive motive to exclude D2 to maintain its
monopoly prot through D1s vertical control with respect to the upstream market. In such
situations, antitrust policies that prohibit refusal-to-deal, with or without the additional
requirement of ECPR, will increase consumer welfare, provided that k and  are small
enough so that innovation still occurs. The social welfare e¤ects of the antitrust policies
are generally ambiguous, even when they do not stie innovation and even when  ! 0,
because the instantaneous social welfare could be higher under downstream monopoly than
under duopoly. The additional condition (10) ensures a positive social welfare e¤ect when
k and  are su¢ ciently small.
It is important to recognize that IPRs grant the IP holder certain exclusive rights, in-
cluding the right to charge a monopoly price for the intermediate good embedding the IP.
In this sense, refusal to deal by the input monopolist, when it is motivated by cost con-
siderations, should not be considered as anticompetitive in the usual sense, even if it does
exclude downstream competition. But to the extent that there can be follow-on innovation
that does not infringe the current monopolists IPRs, as is determined by IP laws, conduct
by the monopolist that has the purpose of deterring future competition from follow-on inno-
vation would be anticompetitive. However, even in the latter case, the consumer and social
welfare e¤ects of prohibiting refusal to deal can be ambiguous, partly due to its e¤ects on
innovation and partly also because there can be other motives. As we have demonstrated,
policies on IP protection and antitrust each has costs and benets; economic analysis can
shed light on how to optimally coordinate them. For example, when IP protection is strong,
the danger from the false positiveof imposing an antitrust liability on refusal to deal is
high, which reduces the desirability of such a policy.
We conclude this section with the following summary:
Remark 2 When innovation is for an intermediate good, IP protection and antitrust tends
to be substitutes as policy instruments: strong IP protection is less desirable in the pres-
ence of restrictive antitrust policy, and, conversely, restrictive antitrust policy is also less
desirable if IP protection is strong.
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Put di¤erently, a free-market approach that imposes no antitrust restrictions is more
likely to be optimal when IP protection is strong, whereas restrictive antitrust is more
likely to be benecial when IP protection is weak.
6. DISCUSSIONS
We next discuss some of the modeling assumptions, possible extensions, and case examples
that our theory potentially sheds light on.
6.1 Vertical Contracting
Our model assumes that upstream rm(s) make linear price o¤ers to downstream produc-
ers. This subsection extends the analysis to situations where rms can use general vertical
contracting to maximize prots. In particular, we consider instantaneous two-part tari¤
contracts specifying both a unit price (w) and a xed fee (T ), possibly also with a long-
term exclusive-dealing clause, that maximize industry prot. For convenience, assume that
the upstream rm(s) will make contract o¤ers, with the downstream rm(s) receiving the
disagreement (reservation) payo¤:
First, suppose that D1 is the only downstream seller. Then after its arrival, U2 will o¤er
equilibrium contract ( ~wo; T o) = (0;  (cL)  o) ; where  (cL)  [p (cL)  cL]Q (p (cL)) ;
~wo = 0 maximizes industry prot, and T o allows U2 to extract maximum payment from
D1, subject to D1s reservation prot o:
Next, suppose that U1 supplies to D2 at t = 0. In this case the results depend on whether
exclusive-dealing clauses are allowed. When such clauses are not feasible, then the main
insights of our model continue to be valid under two-part tari¤ contracts. Specically, Ms
instantaneous prot is the lowest in the presence of both D2 and U2, is higher without
D2, and is the highest with D2 but without U2. Consequently, U1 will supply D2 when 
and  are small but not when  and/or  is large, again having the two motives as in the
main model. Prior to U2s arrival, U1 will o¤er D2 ~wa  po   c together with some T a
to extract surplus from D2. Thus y will be irrelevant, whereas x (or z) will still a¤ect
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consumer and social welfare through (possibly conicting) e¤ects on innovation incentives
and post-innovation market outcomes.30
On the other hand, if exclusive-dealing clauses are feasible, then U1 will no longer have
the anticompetitive motive to refuse to supply D2. After U2s arrival, an exclusive-dealing
contract between U2 and D1, with input price ~wb = 0; will achieve maximum (collusive)
industry prot  (cL) under nal price p (cL) ; and thus in equilibrium U2 will contract with
D1 even if D2 is present to compete for U2s business:31 The disagreement payo¤ of D1,
however, may be a¤ected by the potential competition from D2. If D2 is not allowed to
purchase from U2 by some earlier contract with U1, then D1s disagreement payo¤ in its
contract with U2 is o; if D2 is free to purchase from U2, then competition between D1 and
D2 for U2s exclusive contract will drive D1s disagreement payo¤ to zero.
Thus, at t = 0; U1 has the incentive to o¤er D2 a contract requiring D2 to purchase
exclusively from U1 at unit price ~wa and instantaneous xed fee T a; which U1 can choose
to terminate at some future time, where ~wa  po cmaximizes instantaneous industry prot.
If U1 can o¤er such an exclusive contract, then it will do so as long as the discounted sum
of industry prot is higher with D2 than without D2 before the arrival of U2, and U1s
decision to supply D2 will then no longer be inuenced by the potential future competition
of U2. Notice that since D2 will not receive positive prot after U2s arrival, as U2 will
contract with D1 to achieve higher joint prot, U1 needs to o¤er little compensation to D2
at t = 0 for D2 to agree to the exclusive contract.
To summarize: If rms can engage in exclusive-dealing contracting, then U1 no longer has
the anticompetitive motive to refrain from supplying D2 at t = 0; instead, U1 will have the
incentive to use exclusive-dealing contracts to achieve monopoly outcomes through collusion.
30Our analysis may also be applied to situations where the two markets produce complementary products
in general.
31As Chen and Riordan (2007) observed, a vertically integrated rm is more capable of achieving collusion
with a competitor through an exclusive-dealing contract than a vertically separated rm.
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6.2 Downstream Entry Conditions
Our analysis has assumed that D2 will not be in the market if U1 does not supply it at
t = 0. One possibility for this is that production with U1s technology is necessary for D2 to
be cost e¤ective in using the input from a follow-on innovation. Alternatively, there might
be high opportunity cost for D2 to remain in the market or enter again at some future time,
if it does not produce early on.
Now suppose that U1 is unable to exclude D2; or suppose that there will be other down-
stream entrants in the future. In either case, U1 would have no anticompetitive motive not
to supply D2, provided that  is not a¤ected by selling to D2; and by choosing its price
optimally U1 can potentially increase prot if the presence of D2 brings in e¢ ciency gains
to the industry: U1 might still choose not to supply D2 if it is not cost e¢ cient to do so,
possibly due to high xed cost to supply D2. It is also possible that U1 will not supply D2
even when D2 brings in e¢ ciency gains, if U1s pricing is for some reason constrained or if
the bargaining between U1 and D2 is such that U1 does not benet from supplying D2. In
such situations, however, an antitrust obligation for U1 to supply D2 could either reduce
cost e¢ ciency or further weaken U1s bargaining position, which could unduly reduce U1s
innovation incentive.
6.3 Nature of Potential Upstream Competition
We have assumed that there is only one potential follow-on innovation, to focus on how
future competition for U1s IP may a¤ect U1s incentive to supply a downstream rival
and the welfare e¤ects of IP protection and antitrust. Our analysis can be extended to
situations where there are additional follow-on innovations. When such potential future
upstream competitors are more likely to appear, there will be more incentive for U1 not to
supply D2 in order to maintain monopoly power for the industry through vertical control.
Furthermore, similar results will obtain if a follow-on innovation, when it arrives, is costly
to implement.
To consider the e¤ects of both IPRs and antitrust policies, we have assumed that potential
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future competition comes from a follow-on innovation, so that its probability to occur
depends on IP protection for U1s initial innovation. But the dependence of  on  is not
essential for our arguments; our insights on why U1 may refuse to deal with D2 and on
the welfare e¤ects of prohibiting such conduct would still be valid if  is given exogenously.
Even if the initial monopoly position of U1 is due to its possession of some unique physical
assets, acquired through its investment, and there is a possibility that another upstream
rm may acquire competing physical asset in the future, similar strategic considerations
would be present. Our analysis thus has implications more generally for policies concerning
property rights and antitrust. We focus on innovation and IP, however, because the ex-ante
and ex-post welfare tension is most striking in the case of IP, and because the potential
interaction/coordination between policies on IP and antitrust is especially important in
many industries where innovation drives market performance.
6.4 Case Examples
Our analysis has identied two potential motives for an input monopolist to refuse to
supply an independent downstream rm. A strategic motive may arise when there is poten-
tial upstream competition in the future, and the downstream dominance achieved through
refusal to deal enables the monopolist to maintain monopoly prot via vertical control even
when the upstream market will become competitive. This strategic motive is stronger if sup-
plying the independent downstream rm increases the likelihood of upstream competition
in the future. On the other hand, refusal to deal can also be motivated by cost or e¢ ciency
considerations, such as high setup cost to supply the independent downstream rm and
bargaining failures. The following case examples, despite their apparent di¤erences from
our stylized model, serve to illustrate our ideas.
Both motives identied in our analysis are potentially relevant for the EU Microsoft
case, where the Court of First Instance conrmed the European Commissions nding that
Microsoft had abused its dominance in PCs operating systems by refusing to supply in-
teroperability information to its competitors in the work group server operating systems
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market.32 Such information was considered essential for competitorsserver operating sys-
tems to function e¤ectively in operation with ubiquitous Window-based client PCs. But
if the competitorsserver operating systems potentially o¤ered higher value to some con-
sumers, Microsoft could have shared the e¢ ciency gains by licensing the interoperability
information under copyright protection. So why did Microsoft refuse to do so? One pos-
sibility, as our analysis suggests, is that by not supplying and potentially excluding the
downstream competitors, Microsoft could reduce the threat of competition from rival PC
operating systems in the upstream market, or maintain industry dominance even if the
rival systems become successful. However, it is also possible that Microsoft was unable to
charge a licensing fee that would su¢ ciently compensate it for the potential costs involved
and its potential loss of revenue in the server operating systems market. While refusal to
deal under either possibility could harm competition in the downstream server market, the
legal standard established by the Courts decision and its welfare implications do depend
on what might have been the motive(s).
Refusal to deal can be motivated by strategic considerations in the upstream market even
when the monopolist does not directly compete in the downstream market. For example,
on June 8, 1998, the U.S. Federal Trade Commission led a complaint against Intel, a
dominant rm in the PC microprocessor market, alleging that Intel illegally refused to
deal with computer makers Compaq, Intergraph, and DEC, who possessed patents in rival
microprocessor and related technologies. The complaint alleged that Intel refused to provide
technical information about Intel products for the purpose of forcing those customers to
grant Intel licenses to microprocessor-related technology developed and owned by those
customers, which ... e¤ectively undermine the patent rights of such rms and reduce their
incentives to develop new technologies relating to microprocessors.33 The FTC and Intel
reach a proposed settlement on March 8, 1999, in which Intel promised not to withhold any
technical information customarily furnished to microprocessor chip customers.
Some important refusal-to-deal cases occurred in aftermarkets. In Xerox, for example, the
32Microsoft v Commission, T-201/04, 2007. Microsoft was also found to have engaged in another abusive
conduct by tying the Windows PC operating system with Windows Media Player.
33 In the Matter of Intel Corporation, FTC Docket No. 9288.
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durable-good producer refused to sell patented replacement parts and copyrighted service
manuals to competitors in the copier repair market. The literature on refusal to deal
in aftermarkets has explained why a rm may want to monopolize the aftermarket, for
reasons ranging from exploiting locked-in consumers to avoiding ine¢ ciencies in consumers
choice of maintenance services.34 This literature, however, typically assumes that the service
providers in the aftermarket have equal costs. When other service providers have lower costs,
which seems plausible in some situations, it is less clear why the repair parts monopolist
would choose refusal to deal instead of supplying the competing service providers to share
potential e¢ ciency gains. Since the input monopolist also produces the durable good, the
copier, potential future competition for the patented repair parts seems less likely to be a
major concern. Instead, transaction costs and/or the inability to charge monopoly prices
for the replacement parts might have motivated refusal to deal by the input monopolist.
7. CONCLUSION
At the center of policy discussions concerning property rights and antitrust is the issue of
whether a monopolist, equipped with IP from innovation to produce an intermediate good,
should have an antitrust liability to supply competitors. In this paper, I have developed an
analytical framework to address this issue, starting from clarifying why the monopolist, who
could increase short-term prots from supplying an e¢ cient downstream competitor, may
choose refusal to deal instead. Anticompetitive refusal to deal may occur, but only when
potential upstream competition from a follow-on innovation is likely: By not supplying the
downstream competitor, the monopolist may either make the follow-on innovation less likely,
or achieve monopoly vertical control even if the upstream market becomes competitive in
the future.
The consumer and social welfare e¤ects of imposing an antitrust liability to supply, how-
ever, are generally ambiguous. This is partly because the reduction of monopoly prot
under a restrictive antitrust policy would reduce innovation incentive, and partly also be-
34See Carlton and Waldman (2009) for a detailed discussion of the literature.
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cause refusal to deal can be motivated by other considerations including avoiding high
transaction costs. By disentangling the anticompetitive and cost motives, I identify suf-
cient conditions under which prohibiting refusal to deal would raise or lower consumer
and social welfare. Notably, restricting monopoly pricing for the intermediate good alone
cannot possibly benet consumers.
IP protection and a restrictive antitrust policy towards refusal to deal each has costs and
benets. My analysis shows that they can be optimally coordinated to benet consumers
through their impact on innovation incentives and post-innovation market performance. In
particular, a free-market approach that imposes no antitrust restriction is more benecial
under strong IP protection, whereas restrictive antitrust policies become more desirable
when IP protection is weak.
APPENDIX
Proof of Lemma 1. We rst show that wa + c  p0: Suppose to the contrary that
wa + c < p0: Then min

p0; w + c
	
= w + c and
M (w) =
Z c
c
 
p0   cQ  p0 f (c2) dc2 + Z c
c
wQ
 
p0

f (c2) dc2
< 0 [1  F (c)] +  p0   cQ  p0F (c) = 0:
That is, Ms prot can be increased by raising w from wa to p0   c; a contradiction.
Next, fromA1, p0 c  c and p  p0   c+ c2  p (c) = p0: Thus pa = minp (w + c2) ; p0	 =
p0:
U1s prot-maximizing price wa maximizes the prot of the vertically integrated rm, M:
M (w) =
Z c
p0 w
 
p0   cQ  p0 f (c2) dc2 + Z p0 w
c
wQ
 
p0

f (c2) dc2
= 0

1  F  p0   w+ wQ  p0F  p0   w
for w 2 p0   c; p0   c ; or wa solves 0M (wa) = 0 given by (7), where 0M  p0   c > 0
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and 0M
 
p0   c < 0; implying that p0   c < wa < p0   c: It follows that waQ  p0 > 0;
and hence 0M = M (w
a) > 0:
Proof of Lemma 2. (i) From (6), aM > 
0: Next, if wb1 + w
b
2 + cL  c;
bM =
h
wb1 + w
b
2 + cL  

wb2 + cL
i
F

wb2   wb1 + cL

Q

wb1 + w
b
2 + cL


h
c 

wb2 + cL
i
F

wb2   wb1 + cL

Q (c) < [c  cL]F (c)Q (c)  0;
where the rst inequality follows from (p  ~c)Q (p) increasing in p for p < p (~c) and
p
 
wb2 + cL

> p (0)  c by A1, and the second inequality follows from A2. On the other
hand, if wb1 + w
b
2 + cL > c;
bM = w
b
1F

wb2   wb1 + cL

Q

wb1 + w
b
2 + cL

< [c  cL]F (c)Q (c)  0;
where the rst inequality follows from wb1  wb2  c  cL; wb2   wb1 + cL < c; and F 0 () > 0
but Q0 ()  0; and the second inequality follows from A2.
(ii) Since wb1 + cL  wb2 + cL  c; we have wb1 +wb2 + cL < 2c  p (c) = p0 = pa: It follows
that pb  wb1 + wb2 + cL < p0 = pa; and vb > va = v0:
(iii) The true marginal cost of production in the presence of U2 is cL < min fc; c2g for
c2 > w
b
2 + cL   wb1 and c2 for c2  wb2 + cL   wb1 < c: Thus production cost in the presence
of U2 is lower than that without U2. This, together with pb  wb1 + wb2 + cL < p0 = pa;
implies that sb > sa, and sa = aM + 
a
D2 + v
0 > s01 = s
0 = 0 + v0.
(iv)
bU2 = U2

wb1; w
b
2

= wb2
h
1  F

wb2   wb1 + cL
i
Q

wb2 + cL

 (c  cL)
h
1  F

c  cL   wb1 + cL
i
Q (c  cL + cL) (since wb2 is optimal for U2)
= (c  cL)
h
1  F

c  wb1
i
Q (c) > (c  cL) [1  F (c)]Q (c) (since wb1 > 0)
 (c  cL)Q
 
p0

= 0U2 (from condition (10)).
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i"
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 
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
+
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"
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h
Q

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
 Q  p0i+ Z p0
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
Q (p) Q  p0 dp#
>  F

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
wb2   wb1

Q
 
p0

+
 
p0   cL

Q
 
p0

+
Z 1
p0
Q (p) dp
+
h
1  F

wb2   wb1 + cL
i"
wb2
h
Q

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
 Q  p0i+ Z p0
wb2+cL

Q (p) Q  p0 dp# :
Thus, sb > s02 =
 
p0   cL

Q
 
p0

+
R1
p0 Q (p) dp if
[1  F (w2   w1 + cL)]wb2

Q (w2 + cL) Q
 
p0
  F (w2   w1 + cL)wb2   wb1Q  p0 ;
which holds if
[1  F (w2   w1 + cL)]Q (w2 + cL)  Q
 
p0

;
which, since w2 + cL  c; holds if [1  F (c)]Q (c)  Q
 
p0

:
On the other hand, if kQ0 (p)k ! 0 for p  p0; sb !
F

wb2   wb1 + cL

w1   wb2

Q
 
p0

+

p0   cL

Q
 
p0

+Q
 
p0
 Z wb2 wb1+cL
c
F (c2) dc2+
Z 1
p0
Q (p) dp
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<

p0   cL

Q
 
p0

+ (cL   c)F

wb2   wb1 + cL

Q
 
p0

+
Z 1
p0
Q (p) dp
 p0   cLQ  p0+ v0 = s02:
Proof of Proposition 3. (i) If ! 0; then V x = IdMkV
d ! IdMkV
0  ImaxfoM ;dMgkV
0 
V : If  is large enough, then dM < k and V
x = IdMkV
d = 0  V : Furthermore, if  is
large enough and k  0M ; we have dM < k  0M ; in which case V x = 0 < V 0 = V  and
Sx = 0 < S0 = S: (ii) If k and  are both small enough but  > , then k  dM < 0M ;
and hence V x = V d > V 0 = V ; if in addition (10) holds, then Sd > S0; and hence
Sx = Sd > S0 = S:
Proof of Proposition 6. (i) If k is su¢ ciently small, U1 will innovate. The result then
follows from that both V d and Sd decrease in ; whereas V 0 is not a¤ected by changes in 
but S0 decreases in . (ii) Without antitrust restriction, if the increase in  causes a switch
from dM < max

0M ; k
	
to either dM  0M  k or dM  k > 0M ; then the increase in
 increases consumer welfare since V d > V 0 > 0: (It also increases social welfare when (10)
holds:) On the other hand, consumer and social welfare are zero under x if 
d
M < k and
zero under z if ^
z
M < k: Thus, if an increase in  causes 
d
M  k under x or ^zM  k
under z; then consumer and social welfare are higher under the higher :
Proof of Proposition 7. (i) When  ! 1;  ! 0: Thus, from (11), and (17), when
 ! 0; V d ! V 0 and V z ! V 0  V d: If min
n
dM ; ^
z
M
o
 ^zM  k, U1 will innovate
with or without x or z; and if k > max

dM ;
0
M
	
; U1 will not innovate with or without
x or z: For these cases V
x  V ; V z  V : But if 0M  k > dM ; then V x < V  and
V z < V : (ii) When  < ^,  > ^ and 0M > 
d
M : Thus, if k and  are small enough,
V x = V z = V d > V 0 = V ; whereas S = S0 k and Sx = Sd k < Sz: Thus, if in addition
(10) holds, which implies Sd > S0; we have Sz > Sx > S:
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